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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPRFME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of RAJAHN LEE,
Petitioner,
-againstNEW Y0R.K STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 0 1-07-ST7437 Index No. 174-07
Appearances:

Rajahn Lee
Inmate No. 05-R-1435
Petitioner, Pro Se
Camp Georgetown
3 191 Crumb Hill Road
Georgetown, NY 13072-9307
Andrew M. Cuomo
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(Kelly L. Munkwitz,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)

DECISION/ORDER/J UDGMENT
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice
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The petitioner, an inmate at Camp Georgetown Correctional Facility, has commenced
the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated March

28,2006 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. Petitioner is serving a term of 1

YZyears upon a conviction of criminal posscssion of a controlled substance Shdegrec, a
second felony offense. Petitioner was on parole at the time he committed the instant offense.
The controlling offense and conviction was for criminal sale of a controlled substance 3rd
degree for which he received a sentence of five to ten years.
The petitioner contends that the Parole Board’s decision contained no factual support
or analysis. He maintains that the Parole failed to consider the appropriate factors under
Executive Law

6 2 5 9 4 He argues that he has completed every program and vocation

required of him. He asserts that the Parole Board failed to consider the guidelines set forth
under 9 NYCRR 8002.3 (a). He describes his crimes as non-violent and victimless. He
characterizes himself as “a temperate and insightful individual working hard while in prison
to understand his drug addiction and to reign in whatever instincts precipitated his crime.”
He maintains that the Parole Board failed to consider his extranrdinwy imtitiitional and
rehabilitative record. In petitioner’s view a properly functioning Parole Board would have
released him. The petitioner also criticizes the Parole Board for not providing guidance so
that he could be released on parole in the future. He maintains that the Parole Board
improperly relied solely upon the seriousness of his crimes in rendering its determination.
He argues that there were no aggravating or egregious factors present here to preclude his
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release.
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole
are set forth as follows:
“Despite receipt of an Earned Eligibility Certificate, parole is
denied for the following reasons: After careful review of your
record and this interview, it is the determination of this panel
that if released at this time there is a reasonable probability that
you would not live and remain at liberty without violating the
law and your relcnsc at this time is incompatible with the
welfare and safety of the community. The decision is based on
the following factors: The 1.0. represents a continuation of your
pattern of drug related offenses resulting in this being your third
state term of incarceration. You have violated probation and
parole in the past. All factors considered leads this panel to
conclude that you are unacceptable (sic)candidate for release to
the community.”
As stated in Executive Law $2594 (2) (c) (A):
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine reqpect
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii)
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release
program; (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the
3
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federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s
representative [I” (Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A]).
“Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory
iquircmcnts, not rcvicwablc” i Z l , i t l c r 0 1 S I I I O J NI ~NLY\
I ~ ) ‘ I I I ~ S I i l I c A Board of Parole,lYY
AD2d 960,960 [3rd Dept., 19931, citing Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole,
157 AD2d 944). If the parole board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory
requirements, the board’s determination is not subject to judicial review (see Ristau v.
Hammock, 103 AD2d 944 [3rd Dept., 19841). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality
bordering on impropriety” on the part of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate
judicial intervention

(see

Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting

Matter of Russo i. Pic\\ Y u h Staic W. u i f’;1wIc, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence

of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination made
by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perezv. New Y d Si3tc uf L)i\ iaic)iloi Par&, 294 AD2d
726 [3rd Dept., 20021).
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such
factors as petitioner’s institutional programming, his disciplinary record, and his plans upon
release. Near the end of the interview, the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to make
comments on his own behalf, and did so. The decision was sufficiently detailed to inform
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the petitioner of the reasons for the denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements of
Executive Law $2594 (seeMatter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941;
Matter of Green v. New ~ ‘ o I - L5t,tic Ilii i 4 o i i t i t I);ircdc. 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931).
It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the
inmate’s crimes and their nature (E Matter of Weir v. New York State Division of Parole,

205 AD2d 906, 907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Sinopoli v. New York State Board of
Parole, 189 AD2d 960, sutx-a; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996),
as well as the inmate’s criminal history (E Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629 [3rd
Dept., 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The Parole
Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it considered in
determining the inmate‘s application, or to expressly discuss each one (see Matter of Farid
v Travis, supra; Matter of Moore v New York State Bd. of Parole, 233 AD2d 653 [3rd Dept.,
19961; Matter of Collado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3rd Dept.,
200 11). Nor must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first
sentence of Executive T.aw 5 259-i (2) ( c ) (A) (we V;lttw nf Silvcro v Iknnisnn, 23 AD3d
859 [3rd Dept., 20061).

In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give

considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for
which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the
other statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare
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of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to
undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A], other citations
omitted).
Petitioner’s claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to a resentencing are conclusory and without merit (=Matter of Bockeno v New York State
c
Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 [3‘d Dept., 19961; Matter o! C - I - C ~ i~ K c i i J-ork SMC t~zc~cuti\
.S

DePartment Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d 672 [3‘d Dept., 20011; Matter of Evans v
Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., Westchester Co., 20061). Moreover, it is well settled
that the Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determine whether release was
appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum term of
petitioner’s sentence (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; Matter of
Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141, 1142 [3rdDept., 20061 lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007];
Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3‘d Dept., 20071).
It is well settled that receipt of a certificate of earned eligibility doe? not serve a7 a
guarantee of release

(see,People ex rel. Justice v Russi, 226 AD2d 821 [3rd Dept., 19961;

Matter of Flecha v Russi, 22 1 AD2d 780 [3rd Dept., 19851; Matter of Walker v Russi, 176
AD2d 1185 [3rd Dept., 19911 lv dismissed 79 NY2d 897). In addition, the Parole Board’s
decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 months) is within the Boardls
discretion and was supported by the record (=,
Matter of ‘Iatta v State of New York
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Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98 NY2d 604).
Petitioner's argument that the Parole Board is required to advise petitioner and/or
provide guidance with regard to the programs he should take, or rehabilitative efforts he
should cng;iSc in to incrcse his chance for release at a future parole interview has no merit

(E Executive Law 5 259-i [2] [a]; 9 NYCRR

9 8002.3; Boothe v Hammock, 605 F2d 661

[2ndCir, 19791; Matter of Freeman v New York State Division of Parole, 2 1 AD3d 1 174 [3rd
Dept., 20051).
With respect to petitioner's argument concerning the guideline range (see,9 NYCRR

800 1.3), the guidelines "are intended only as a guide, and are not a substitute for the careful
consideration of the many circumstances of each individual case'' (see,9 NYCRR 800 1.3 [a];
Matter of Tail2

I

Siaic ul'hcit J ' d L)ii isivri ut' Parole, 290 AD2d 907, 908 [3rd Dept.,

20021). Thus, the Court finds that this does not serve as a basis to overturn the Board's
decision.
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and finds them to be without
merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The
petition must therefore be dismissed.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.
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This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. All papers are
returned to the attorney for the respondent who is directed to enter this
Decision/Order/Judgment without notice and to serve petitioner with a copy of this
llecision/Ordcr with notice. of entry.

I
I

ENTER

Dated:

June 3 4 , 2 0 0 7
Troy, New York
George B. Ceresia, Jr.

Papers Considered:
1
2.
3.
4.

Order To Show Cause dated January 18,2007, Petition, Supporting Papers
and Exhibits
Respondent’s Answer dated April 6,2007, Supporting Papers and Exhibits
Affirmation of Kelly L. Munkwitz, Esq., Assistant Attorney General dated
April 6, 2007
Petitioner’s Opposition To Respondent’s Motion To Dismiss Petition
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